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Abstract A model of self-knowledge is proposed which summarizes and integrates a
few distinctions concerning self-standards and related self-discrepancies. Four types of
self-standards are distinguished (i.e. ideal, ought, undesired and forbidden selves) and a
hierarchical organization of these standards is postulated. There is a basic contrast
between positive and negative standards at the higher level of the hierarchy, whereas
Higgins’ distinction between ideals and oughts is found at the lower level. Every self-
standard is analyzed in terms of two types of self-discrepancies. Many previous studies
explored discrepancies between self-standards and the actual self, i.e. the perceived
actualization of standards. The present study proposed that discrepancies between self-
standards and the can self are a second type of discrepancy that should be included in
structural models of self-knowledge. The can self consists of self-beliefs referring to
capabilities and potentials; thus, this additional type of discrepancy reflects the per-
ceived attainability of standards. Consequently, the present study explored a set of eight
self-discrepancies, i.e. both the perceived actualization and the attainability of four self-
standards. In order to assess the intercorrelations among these eight self-discrepancies,
participants (N=404) completed a newly developed online measure. CFA modeling
confirmed the postulated two-level hierarchy of self-standards. The reasonability of
including discrepancies between self-standards and the can self in the structural model
of self-knowledge was also confirmed.
Keywords Self-standards .Self-discrepancies .Canself .Attainabilityofstandards .CFA
Subjective beliefs about oneself play an important role in the processes of self-
regulation. Setting goals and monitoring progress towards their achievement requires
self-knowledge, referring to some standard (e.g. the ideal self), as well as an assessment
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of the degree of actualization of that standard. This idea is clearly described by Duval
andWicklund (1972) in their objective self-awareness theory (see also Silvia and Duval
2001). They conceptualized self-regulation as a process of dealing with the perceived
discrepancy between the actual self and self-standards. When attention is focused on the
self, one compares actual self-view with a particular standard. Perceived discrepancy
between self and standard results in negative affect, which induces various self-
regulatory strategies.
The aim of the present paper is to construct and test a structural model of self-beliefs
that may be useful in analyzing self-regulation processes, though self-regulation per se
is not directly studied here. This research is focused on self-knowledge – i.e., subjective
self-perception and beliefs about oneself. The behavioral aspects of self-regulation are
not measured and, consequently, they are not included in the analyses. However, based
on theoretical models of self-regulation (e.g., Carver and Scheier 1998; Duval and
Wicklund 1972; Higgins 1997), hypothetical links between self-knowledge and behav-
ior are formulated throughout the paper. Assuming the central role of self-standards in
self-regulation, a structural model of self-knowledge is proposed, which focuses on (a)
detailed description of self-standards with a proposal of their taxonomy and hierarchy
as well as on (b) the structure of self-discrepancies – i.e., the relations between self-
standards and other aspects of self-beliefs.
Self-Standards
Self standards are preferential self-beliefs (as opposed to descriptive and evaluative ones),
which consist of self-imposed criteria for judging oneself (Morris and Kanfer 1995).
They are self-views that refer to some desired or undesired end-states. The concept of
self-standards can be seen in the broader context of possible selves theory (Markus and
Nurius 1986). In contrast to the actual (current) self, self-standards are possible selves1
and, as such, they refer to imagined future states of the self that may be actualized one day
but may also never be reached. Markus and Nurius (1986, p. 954) distinguished between
the possible selves “wewould very much like to become” and the possible selves “we are
afraid of becoming.” The positive future potentials are called hoped-for selves, while the
negative, unwanted possibilities are called feared selves. According to this classic
approach, although the possible selves are cognitive structures (i.e., they refer to self-
perception, not to behavior per se), they operate as incentives for future behavior (e.g.,
Freeman et al. 2001; Robinson et al. 2003; Sobh and Martin 2008). Recent analyses
specified the conditions for possible selves to be effective regulators of behavior (Norman
and Aron 2003; Oyserman and James 2009) and the mechanisms by which the process
operates. Hoyle and Sherrill (2006) proposed that possible selves do not directly influ-
ence behavior but rather function as sources of standards for self-regulation – “standards
against which current self-representation is compared and with which it is reconciled
through behavior” (p. 1687) (see also vanDellen and Hoyle 2008). Hoped-for selves
function as positive standards while feared selves function as negative standards.
1 Although the concept of possible selves (Markus and Nurius 1986) is somewhat broader than the concept of
self-standards, the core of theorizing on possible selves refers to self-standards as well. Even if there are
possible selves different form self-standards, every self-standard represents the category of possible selves.
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The idea that there are both positive and negative standards and that they cooperate
in the process of self-regulation was also clearly expressed by Carver and Scheier
(1998) in their control theory of approach and avoidance. They distinguished between
two systems of regulating behavior. The approach system has a positive standard as the
reference point and the ultimate goal of the system is to move the actual self as close as
possible to the positive standard – that is, to minimize the discrepancy between the self
and the standard. The avoidance system, in contrast, has a negative standard as the
reference point and the ultimate goal of the system is to move the actual self as far as
possible away from the negative standard – that is, to maximize the discrepancy
between the self and the standard. The two systems represent independent, though
functionally interconnected, processes of self-regulation (Carver et al. 1999; Carver and
Scheier 1998; Woodman and Hemmings 2008). Carver (2006) argued that approach
and avoidance are the very basic behavioral tendencies, which are closely related to
temperamental dimensions of BAS (behavioral activation system) and BIS (behavioral
inhibition system), respectively, and managed by distinct neural structures. Assuming
that the approach-avoidance distinction is so fundamental for the analyses of self-
regulatory processes, the present study postulates that the distinction between positive
and negative standards (i.e., reference points for approach and avoidance, respectively)
should also be seen at the very basic level in the structural models of self-knowledge.
However, besides this general distinction between positive and negative self-
standards, other differentiations can be found in the literature. Among the most impor-
tant ones, there is the distinction between an ideal self and an ought self as proposed by
Higgins (1987) in his self-discrepancy theory. The ideal self is the representation of the
attributes that one would ideally like to possess – the representation of one’s hopes,
aspirations, and wishes. The ought self represents the attributes that one believes one
should possess – that is, one’s sense of duty, obligation, and responsibility. The two self-
standards are responsible for vulnerability to different negative emotions – dejection-
related and agitation-related emotions, respectively (Higgins 1987). They also operate as
bases for two different regulatory foci – the ideal self for promotion regulatory focus and
the ought self for prevention regulatory focus (Higgins 1997).
Despite the differences, however, both the ideal self and the ought self refer to some
desired end-states that are to be approached. Hence, although there is a difference
between ideal-based and ought-based desirability, both the ideal self and the ought self
represent positive standards. We can say, then, that Higgins’ differentiation is, in
essence, a more detailed description of the general category of positive standards. A
question arises of whether negative standards can be differentiated in a similar way. If
the ideal self and the ought self are two types of positive, approach-related standards, an
analogous distinction between “un-ideal” and “un-ought” selves as two types of
negative, avoidance-related standards seems reasonable. The literature, however, is less
explicit about it and the latter distinction needs more direct formulation.
The concept of undesired self fits the meaning of un-ideal self well. Ogilvie (1987)
defined the undesired self as the opposite of the ideal self and operationalized it as an
answer to the question: “How I hope to never be?” He argued that the undesired self is
an important self-standard whose regulatory significance has been erroneously
neglected in most analyses of emotional and motivational consequences of self-
knowledge. The discrepancy between the undesired self and the actual self seems to
be even more important than the discrepancy between the ideal self and the actual self
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in predicting life satisfaction (Ogilvie 1987; Ogilvie and Clark 1992), self-esteem
(Endo 1992), and negative affect (Cheung 1997; Heppen and Ogilvie 2003; Ogilvie
et al. 2008; Phillips et al. 2007). Moreover, the correlations between these two types of
self-discrepancies (i.e., the perceived actualization of the undesired self and the per-
ceived actualization of the ideal self) are weak and insignificant (Heppen and Ogilvie
2003; Ogilvie and Clark 1992). This suggests that the undesired self is not a simple
reverse of the ideal self but rather an independent self-standard.
In contrast to the well-established concept of the undesired self, the conceptualization
of the negative counterpart of the ought self has not been so clearly formulated. There is
an example of the term feared self being used in this un-ought sense (Carver et al. 1999).
Nevertheless, the basic definition of the feared self proposed by Markus and Nurius
(1986) does not specify it in this way. In most studies referring to this term (e.g. Sobh and
Martin 2008; Vignoles et al. 2008;Woodman andHemmings 2008) it is not clear whether
the feared self is the possible self that a person does not want to become (i.e. the un-ideal
self) or rather that which a person believes they should not become (i.e. the un-ought
self). Usually, the term feared self is used in a general sense, referring to negative
standards, without further differentiation being made. Despite this lack of explicit
formulation in the existing literature, the distinction between ideal and ought aspects of
negative self-standards seems to be a legitimate element in the typology of self-standards.
Summing up, there are two distinctions within the field of self-standards: (a)
between positive and negative standards and (b) between ideals and oughts. It is
proposed here that these distinctions are not competing ones, but rather that they can
be combined, resulting in the following two-level typology of self-standards:
1. Positive standards – reference points for approach-related self-regulatory processes
1.1. The ideal self – the representation of the attributes that one would like to
possess, reflecting one’s hopes, aspirations, and wishes.
1.2. The ought self – the representation of the attributes that one believes one
should possess, reflecting one’s sense of duty, obligation, and responsibility.
2. Negative standards – reference points for avoidance-related self-regulatory
processes
2.1. The undesired self – the representation of the attributes that one would not
like to possess – i.e., the negative counterpart of the ideal self.
2.2. The forbidden self – the representation of the attributes that one believes one
should not possess – i.e., the negative counterpart of the ought self.2
2 As the forbidden self is the only new term among the four names of self-standards, it requires an additional
short comment. I decided to use this new term instead of the term feared self for two reasons. Firstly, the
literature on possible selves is not specific as to whether the feared self is the self that one believes one should
not become or the self that one does not want to become. Secondly, the word feared has clear emotional
connotations, which draws attention mainly to the emotional consequences of attaining self-standards and
away from other important aspects of self-regulation. Moreover, it focuses specifically on fear, while it is not
obvious that, of all emotions, fear is the most important emotional consequence of realizing a negative
standard. For these reasons, the term forbidden self was chosen. It points explicitly to the imagined self that the
person believes they ought not to become. It also seems to have connotations broader than only emotional.
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The proposed typology distinguishes between ideal and ought aspects of both
positive and negative self-standards. It is hypothesized here that self-standards are
hierarchically organized – i.e., the ideal-ought distinction is nested within the higher-
level (i.e., more basic) positive–negative distinction. The general category of positive
standards is postulated to be superior to the distinction between the ideal self and the
ought self. Analogically, the general category of negative standards is postulated to be
superior to the distinction between the undesired self and the forbidden self. The
verification of this postulated hierarchy of self-standards is one of the two main
objectives of the present study.
Self-Discrepancies
Self-standards play an important role in the processes of self-regulation. What is
crucial, however, is not the mere content of a particular standard but the relations
between self-standards and other aspects of self-knowledge. These relations can be
described in terms of self-discrepancy, which is defined as the degree of dissimilarity
between two given aspects of self-knowledge. Among different self-discrepancies,
those reflecting the relations between self-standards and the actual self have received
the most theoretical and empirical attention (e.g., Amico et al. 2004; Phillips and Silvia
2010; Vangronsveld et al. 2011; Wasylkiw et al. 2010). Self-discrepancies of this type
reflect the perceived degree of actualization of standards and, as such, play an important
role in the emotional, motivational, and behavioral aspects of self-regulation.
According to this view, self-regulation is the process of reducing the discrepancies
between the actual self and positive standards and enlarging the discrepancies between
the actual self and negative standards (e.g., Carver and Scheier 1998).
In the present paper I argue that, apart from the undoubtedly important discrepancies
between self-standards and the actual self, there are self-discrepancies of another kind
that should be included in models of self-regulation. They are discrepancies between
self-standards and the can self. Higgins et al. (1990) defined the can self as the element
of self-knowledge referring to one’s capabilities and potentials. It is one’s representa-
tion of self attributes that are expected to be actualized in the future – i.e., the attributes
that one believes she/he can possess even if they have not been actualized yet (Higgins
et al. 1990, p. 171). Thus, discrepancies between self-standards and the can self reflect
the perceived attainability of standards. In the case of positive standards, the smaller the
discrepancy, the more firmly one is convinced that the desired end-state will be
attained. The opposite applies to negative standards: the smaller the discrepancy, the
higher the perceived risk of unwanted possibilities becoming actualized.
It seems reasonable that the emotional, motivational, and behavioral aspects of self-
regulation depend not only on the degree to which standards are perceived as already
realized, but also on the expectations that standards will be realized in the future. In
most cases, those two types of self-discrepancies are probably related. Usually, the
greater the distance between a person’s actual self-view and the desired end-state, the
weaker the belief that this discrepancy can be reduced. Conversely, the closer the actual
self is to an individual’s standard, the more confident the individual is that he or she is
able to actualize the standard. It is possible, however, that the perceived actualization of
standards and their perceived attainability operate separately. We can think of a
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situation in which a person perceives themselves as highly different form their ideals
(large actual-ideal discrepancy) but at the same time is strongly convinced that they
have all the capabilities and resources that are needed to reach this desired goal in the
future. On the other hand, we can imagine the opposite situation: one in which a person
is quite close to his or her ideal goal but at the same time does not believe that he or she
is capable of reaching it.
The perceived attainability of standards, then, appears to be an important aspect of
self-beliefs: one that should be included in the structure of self-discrepancies as one of
its components. The idea that self-knowledge regarding one’s potentials and capabil-
ities plays an important role in self-regulation is not new in psychology. It has been
clearly expressed by Bandura (e.g., 2001) and widely studied within the self-efficacy
paradigm (e.g., Endler et al. 2001; Flett et al. 2011; Maddux and Volkmann 2010; Oleś
et al. 2013). Although there is striking similarity between the concepts of self-efficacy
and can self, certain important differences between the approach employed in the
present study and the classic self-efficacy paradigm should be emphasized. First, self-
efficacy beliefs are conceptualized as agentic capability – a belief that one can perform
a given activity as the agent (Bandura 2001). This agentic aspect, however, is not so
central in the present study as it is in the case of self-efficacy. The can self as a specific
aspect of self-knowledge refers to the belief that a particular self-view can possibly
become the actual self in the future, regardless of the degree of agency that the subject
attributes to himself or herself.
Second, the aim of the present study is to place the can self in the framework of self-
discrepancy theory along with discrepancies between self-standards and the actual self.
There is, to my knowledge, only one published study that addresses this problem
directly. Higgins et al. (1990) provided an interesting theoretical analysis and prelim-
inary empirical data showing that the discrepancy between the ideal self and the can
self moderates the regulatory functions of the discrepancy between the ideal self and
the actual self. They postulated that discrepancies should be considered in terms of a
holistic pattern rather than viewed separately. The perceived attainability of standards
seems to be an important component of such a holistic model.
The Present Study
The present study started with a model that, synthesizing all the above-mentioned
aspects of self-knowledge, distinguishes four different self-standards (ideal, ought,
undesired and forbidden selves) and related eight self-discrepancies. Four discrepancies
reflect the relations between self-standards and the actual self, while, the other four
reflect the relations between the same standards and the can self. The study aimed at
verifying the hypothesis that apart from the perceived actualization of standards the
perceived attainability of those standards are integral aspects of the structure of
self-beliefs.
The main goal of this study, however, was to verify a hypothesis regarding the
hierarchical organization of self-standards. It was hypothesized that the distinction
between positive and negative standards is superior to the distinction between ideals
and oughts. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to test the postulated
hierarchy of standards. In terms of CFA, the hypothesis claimed that the hierarchical
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latent variable model with the positive versus negative distinction at the higher level
and the ideal versus ought distinction at the lower level of the hierarchy of self-
standards fits data better than the alternative model with the opposite hierarchy of
standards (i.e. with the ideal versus ought distinction at the higher level and the positive
versus negative distinction at the lower level).
Method
Participants and Procedure
The participants were Polish students, representing a wide range of academic majors.
The main part of the study was conducted via the Internet. According to the terminol-
ogy proposed by Nosek et al. (2002), it was an Internet study with invited accessibility
design and targeted advertising as recruitment method. In the course of the recruitment
process, the researcher met groups of students during their classes and, after introducing
himself and giving short oral information about the study, distributed small paper
leaflets. The leaflets contained invitation to take part in the study, general information
about the study, the link to the Web page, a login, a password, an individual code, and
the researcher’s contact information. The students were free to take or not to take the
leaflet as well as to take an additional one for a friend who could be interested in
participation.
The Web application used in the study was available only for those who used the
information from the leaflet. The login and password served as a protection against
accidental users. The individual code allowed to ensure additional control of multiple
participation of the same person (see Birnbaum 2004). A total of 1,550 leaflets inviting
to take part in the study were distributed among potential participants, of whom 451
(292 women) logged in on the Web page and completed the procedure. Data from 40
participants were removed because either the content of the responses suggested that
they were provided thoughtlessly or the participant explicitly expressed negative
attitude towards the study (see Discussion for more details). Additional 7 records were
removed due to technical server errors that occurred during the process of data
collection. The final sample was composed of 404 participants (275 women) between
the ages of 18 and 31 (M=21.04; SD=1.85).
Measure
Self-discrepancies were measured using a newly developed computerized procedure,
inspired by (though substantially more elaborate than) the computer version of Higgins’
Selves Questionnaire (Higgins et al. 1997). The procedure started with a short (ap-
proximately five-minute) practice trial, whose aim was to familiarize the participant
with the formal and technical aspects of the instrument. Then the measurement of self-
discrepancies itself followed. It consisted of two elements: (a) listing the descriptions of
self-standards and (b) assessment of self-discrepancies. First, participants described the
content of their self-standards by generating four lists. Each list consisted of 6 attri-
butes, referring to ideal, ought, undesired, and forbidden selves, respectively. As a
result, each participant provided 24 idiographically generated attributes (see Appendix
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for example attributes). After each list had been generated, an additional instruction
asked the participant to mark those attributes that were subjectively the most important
in that particular context (ideal, ought, undesired, or forbidden). The marked attributes
were assumed to be the most salient content of self-standards, which was reflected in
the subsequent calculation of self-discrepancy indices (see Appendix for more details).
In the second part of the procedure, the descriptions of self-standards served as a
basis for the assessment of the perceived actualization of standards and their perceived
attainability. For this purpose, the previously listed 24 attributes were twice presented in
a random order. Firstly, to assess the discrepancies between standards and the actual self
(i.e. perceived actualization of standards), participants rated the extent to which they
actually possessed a given attribute. Secondly, to assess the discrepancy between
standards and the can self (i.e. perceived attainability of standards), participants rated
the extent to which they believed it was possible for them to acquire a given attribute.
The self-discrepancy ratings were given using electronic visual analogue scales
(VAS; see Jamison et al. 2002). The VAS were presented as horizontal lines with
verbal anchors labeling the ends. A small vertical slider was set by default at the middle
of each line. Using the mouse, participants moved the slider along the line and set it at
the appropriate point that best indicated their perceived actualization (or attainability) of
a given standard. In the case of the assessment of discrepancies between standards and
the actual self, the individual answered the question “To what extent are you …?” –
with the previously generated 24 attributes inserted one by one in a random order.
Participants indicated their perceived actualization of every standard-attribute using the
VAS anchored by: I am not like this at all and I am like this very much. An analogous
procedure measured discrepancies between standards and the can self. The question
participants answered in this case was: “To what extent is it possible for you to become
…?”. The appropriate VAS was anchored by: It is completely impossible for me to
become like this and It is definitely possible for me to become like this. The software
transformed VAS responses into discrepancy scores ranging from zero to 100, where
100 indicated the highest level of discrepancy between a given standard attribute and
the actual self or the can self, respectively (for illustration of this assessment, see
Appendix). The overall discrepancy was operationalized as the weighted mean of
scores for 6 attributes describing a given standard. Weights were assigned depending
on whether a particular attribute had been marked as “the most important” one. The
ratings for the marked attributes were weighted by 2, while the ratings for the unmarked
attributes were weighted by 1. The total of ratings for all six attributes multiplied by
their weights was then divided by the sum of the weights. The overall procedure
provided the measurement of 8 different discrepancies, as listed in Table 1. They
served as observable variables in the CFA modeling.
Results
The main objective of the study focused on the hierarchical organization of self-
standards. It was tested with the second-order CFA models. The hierarchy of self-
standards was conveyed by the configuration of latent variables in the models. Self-
discrepancies served as observed (input) variables in the analyses. The procedure
described in the previous section provided eight self-discrepancy indices. Four out of
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these eight variables refer to the perceived actualization of standards (discrepancies
between self-standards and the actual self), while the other four reflect the perceived
attainability of the same standards (discrepancies between self-standards and the can
self). Descriptive statistics for these eight variables are presented in Table 1. All
correlations among self-discrepancy indices were significant though their strength
varied form weak to strong. For every discrepancy involving a positive standard (i.e.
the ideal self or the ought self) paired with any discrepancy involving a negative
standard (i.e. the undesired self or the forbidden self) the correlations were negative
and varied from weak (r=−.23) to moderate (r=−.45). In contrast, when both correlated
discrepancies referred to positive or to negative standards the coefficients were positive
and varied from moderate (r=.47) to strong (r=.74).
Confirmatory factor analyses were conducted using Amos 21 (Arbuckle 2009).
Because of multivariate kurtosis (c.r. = 18.67), the asymptotic distribution-free (ADF)
estimator (see Byrne 2010) was used for both models presented below. There were
neither missing data nor multivariate outliers in the data set. Based on the recommen-
dations by Kline (2005) and by Schreiber et al. (2006), the following criteria were
applied to evaluate the goodness of fit: the chi-square (χ2) likelihood ratio statistic,
Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), and the Root Mean Square
Error of Approximation (RMSEA) with 90 % confidence intervals (CI). To correct the
sensitivity of χ2 to sample size, the ratio of χ2 to df is also reported, with the value of
the ratio lower than or equal to 2 indicating acceptable fit. CFI and TLI values higher
than or equal to .95 and for the RMSEA value lower than .05 were accepted as
indicative of good fit. Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) was used to
compare nonnested models, with smaller values representing better fit (Byrne
2010; Schreiber et al. 2006).
It was hypothesized that the distinction between positive and negative standards is
more basic than the distinction between ideals and oughts. The first model (see Fig. 1)
reflects the hypothesized hierarchical structure of self-standards and related self-
discrepancies. The model consists of two levels of latent variables. There are two latent
variables at the higher (more general) level of the hierarchy. Each of them splits into
two more detailed latent variables, which results in four variables at the lower level of
the hierarchy. The distinction between positive versus negative standards can be seen at
Table 1 The summary of means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations for self-discrepancy scores
Self-discrepancy M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. IA: ideal-actual 43.81 17.76 -
2. IC: ideal-can 26.33 16.26 .69 -
3. OA: ought-actual 38.40 17.07 .62 .47 -
4. OC: ought-can 22.91 14.73 .49 .74 .70 -
5. UA: undesired-actual 64.46 19.24 −.45 −.33 −.40 −.33 -
6. UC: undesired-can 62.67 20.93 −.32 −.26 −.26 −.23 .70 -
7. FA: forbidden-actual 58.90 20.82 −.41 −.29 −.39 −.34 .66 .47 -
8. FC: forbidden-can 58.65 23.09 −.31 −.24 −.29 −.28 .51 .73 .73 -
All correlations are significant at p<.001
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the higher level of the hierarchy, while the lower level reflects the distinction between
ideals and oughts. Self-discrepancies operate at the level of observed variables.
Each of the four lower-level latent variables is loaded by a similar pair of observed
variables. Each pair consists of two analogous types of self-discrepancies. The first
concerns the perceived actualization of a particular standard, while the second one
concerns the perceived attainability of the same standard. The pairs of observed
variables differ only in the standard that is involved in the two self-discrepancies.
The first pair clusters discrepancies involving the ideal self – the perceived actualization
and the perceived attainability of ideals. Thus, the resulting latent variable is called
“ideal.” The second pair clusters analogous ought-discrepancies, while the third and
fourth pairs cluster discrepancies involving undesired and forbidden selves, respective-
ly. Thus, the content of the latent variables from the lower level of the hierarchy is
defined by both perceived actualization and perceived attainability of a particular
standard. The same pattern is true in the case of all four standards: ideal, ought,
undesired, and forbidden selves. The reason why a particular latent variable gets the
name of a specific self-standard is that this standards is the common element of all
observed variables (self-discrepancies) which load on this specific latent variable.
Moving to the higher level of the hierarchy, one can see that latent variables reflecting
four standards form two more general variables. One of them clusters positive standards
(both ideal and ought), while the other one clusters negative standards (both undesired
and forbidden). Such a structure of latent variables clearly corresponds to the typology
























































Fig. 1 Model 1 – the hierarchical model of self-standards and related self-discrepancies. The hierarchy of self-
standards is represented at the level of latent variables (ellipses). The observed variables (rectangles) are
discrepancies between self-standards and the actual self/the can self. Standardized estimates are reported
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which supports the main hypothesis (see Table 2, Model 1). Although the correlations
between two pairs of residuals have not been predicted in the postulated model, they
have a theoretical justification. The variables whose errors are correlated have similar
meaning. In both cases, the errors concern the perceived attainability of standards: the
attainability of positive standards in the case of correlation between e2 and e4 and the
attainability of negative standards in the case of correlation between e6 and e8.
In order to strengthen the verification of the proposed hierarchy of standards, an
alternative model was tested (see Fig. 2). The modified model defines the hierarchy of
standards in the opposite direction, making the ideal versus ought distinction superior
to the distinction between positive and negative standards. As a result, both ideals and
oughts split into their positive and negative aspects – in contrast to the previous model,
where both positive and negative standards split into their ideal and ought aspects.
Similar to the first model, two pairs of correlated residuals were added (according to the
modification indices). Even after allowing for the correlated residuals the alternative
model does not fit the data (see Table 2, Model 2), which supports the postulated
hierarchy of standards.
Discussion
Assuming that self-knowledge plays an important role in the processes of self-
regulation, the present study focused on the structure of self-beliefs. The aim of the
study was to construct and test a structural model of self-beliefs that would later be
useful as background for analyses of self-regulation processes. The starting point for
building such a model was the typology of self-standards, which served as a basis for
distinguishing eight self-discrepancies. Two types of positive self-standards were
distinguished (the ideal self and the ought self) along with the analogous two types
of negative self-standards (the undesired self and the forbidden self). The content of
each standard was assessed in terms of their perceived actualization (discrepancy
between a self-standard and the actual self) and their perceived attainability (discrep-
ancy between a self-standard and the can self). The results confirmed the hypothesized
structural model of self-knowledge, which can be summarized by two general points:
& There are two levels in the hierarchy of self standards, with the distinction between
positive and negative standards being more basic than the distinction between ideals
and oughts.
& Apart from discrepancies between standards and the actual self (perceived actual-
ization of standards), discrepancies between standards and the can self (perceived
attainability of standards) are integral aspects of the structure of self-beliefs.
Table 2 Fit indices for the CFA models
Model χ2 df p χ2/df CFI TLI RMSEA (90 % CI) AIC
Model 1 11.19 13 .595 .861 1.00 1.00 .001 (.001 – .043) 57.19
Model 2 101.23 13 .000 7.787 .867 .713 .130 (.107 – .154) 147.23
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The Hierarchy of Self-Standards
The main implication of the present study refers to the hierarchy of self-standards. The
obtained data fit the postulated model, in which the higher-level (i.e., more basic)
distinction between negative and positive standards splits into lower-level distinctions
between ideals and oughts. The alternative model, assuming the opposite direction in
the hierarchy of standards (with the distinction between ideals and oughts as more
basic) does not fit the data. Looking for support for the proposed hierarchy in the
structure of self-knowledge, some clear analogies in the broader theoretical context of
evaluations and attitudes can be found. Starting from Osgood’s early work, we can see
the positive–negative distinction as the most fundamental dimension of meaning
(Osgood et al. 1957). This idea is further clearly and explicitly present in conceptual-
izations of attitudes (e.g., Cacioppo and Berntson 1994; Eagly and Chaiken 2007). If
positive vs. negative evaluation is the basic dimension in attitudes towards external
objects, the same should also be observed in attitudes toward oneself. This is what the
present study shows. The structure of evaluating one’s own attributes clearly corre-
sponds to the general structure of meaning in attitude formation.
The idea that this positive–negative dichotomy is a basic distinction in the structure
of self-knowledge is also consistent with some neuropsychological data. Research by
Davidson and collaborators (e.g., Buss et al. 2003; Silva et al. 2002; Tomarken et al.
1992) showed a functional asymmetry in the activation of the prefrontal cortex when
approach vs. avoidance behavioral processes operate. Connected with this are differ-
ences at the level of positive and negative affect. The analysis of EEG data revealed






















































Fig. 2 Model 2 – the alternative version of the hierarchical model. Standardized estimates are reported
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exposure to negative stimuli, and a behavioral tendency to avoid and withdraw. On the
other hand, the connections have been found between the activation of the left
prefrontal cortex and positive affect, exposure to positive stimuli and behavioral
tendency to approach and engage (e.g., Buss et al. 2003; Tomarken et al. 1992).
Referring to these results, Carver (2001) suggested that approach and avoidance
processes (as described in his theory of self-regulation) are rooted in and governed
by distinct neural systems. Assuming that approach processes engage positive stan-
dards and avoidance processes engage negative standards, we can speculate about the
distinctive connections between negative standards and right prefrontal cortex and
between positive standards and left prefrontal cortex. Consequently, if the two types
of standards have independent neurological correlates, the distinction between positive
and negative aspects of self-knowledge should be seen at the very basic level in the
structural models of self-knowledge. This is exactly what the model proposed in the
present study reflects.
What are the implications of this model to current theories describing the regulatory
functions of self-standards? Let us consider two prominent theories: (a) Higgins’ (1997)
regulatory focus theory as well as (b) Carver and Scheier’s (1998) model of self-
regulating feedback systems. In Higgins’ (1997) theorizing, the most basic distinction
is the one between ideals and oughts, which is the starting point for describing two
modes of self-regulation – promotion and prevention regulatory foci. By contrast, in
Carver and Scheier’s (1998) model the most basic processes of self-regulation are
described in terms of approach and avoidance systems, with positive and negative
standards as reference values for the two systems, respectively. The hierarchical models
tested in this study suggest that it is Carver and Scheier’s rather than Higgins’ model
that more accurately reflects the basic distinctions in self-knowledge (at least when self-
knowledge is analyzed for the sake of better understanding of self-regulatory process-
es). This does not mean, however, that Higgins’ (1987) model is no longer valid. The
CFA confirms that the ideal self is distinguishable from the ought self and, likewise –
that the undesired (i.e., un-ideal) self is distinguishable from the forbidden (i.e., un-
ought) self. Yet, the ideal-ought dichotomy seems to be inferior to the broader positive–
negative dichotomy. Approaching positive standards and avoiding negative standards –
these are the two basic modes of behavior regulation. Still, there are two slightly
different modes of both approach and avoidance. The general behavioral tendency of
approaching positives diversifies into two content-specific modes: approaching ideals
and approaching oughts. Similarly, the general behavioral tendency of avoiding nega-
tives diversifies into two content-specific modes: avoiding the undesired self and
avoiding the forbidden self.
This idea of hierarchical organization of self-standards (and the related regulatory
processes) is very similar to the two-level model recently proposed by Strauman and
Wilson (2010). They distinguished between biobehavioral and social cognitive systems
for approach and avoidance. The basic, biobehavioral level refers to temperamental
tendencies usually described in terms of behavioral activation (BAS) and behavioral
inhibition (BIS) systems. The lower, more specific level refers to strategies for ap-
proach and avoidance that are acquired through social learning. Promotion vs. preven-
tion strategies, for which ideals vs. oughts serve as self-regulatory standards (Higgins
1997), were proposed as a good exemplar for this lower level. The results of the present
study are consistent with this two-level model, which is especially interesting given that
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I did not include any data from the biobehavioral level in my analyses. In this context I
would venture to hypothesize that (a) both biobehavioral and social cognitive levels, as
proposed by Strauman and Wilson (2010), are reflected in self-knowledge and; (b)
consequently, they can be detected by analyzing the structure of self-beliefs using a
latent variable methodology.
Perceived Attainability of Standards
The present study supports the postulate of including the perceived attainability of
standards (i.e. discrepancies between self-standards and the can self) in the model of
self-knowledge. Perceived attainability operates at the level of observed variables,
loading on each lower-level latent variable. There are analogous pairs of observed
variables, each pair reflecting both the perceived actualization of a given
standard and its perceived attainability. This is true in the case of all four
self-standards – the ideal self, the ought self, the undesired self, and the
forbidden self. If we assume that the model represents the structural underpin-
nings of self-regulatory processes, this pairing of observed variables suggests
that the regulatory functions of every self-standard involve two parallel cogni-
tive processes: (a) assessing the degree to which the actual self is like the
standard, and (b) assessing the degree to which a given standard is perceived as
possible to be achieved in the future.
The basic idea of most theories of self-regulation is that the evaluation of the self
from the perspective of standards leads to certain behavioral tendencies – namely,
tendencies to move the self closer to the standard (in the case of positive standards) or
to move it away from the standard (in the case of negative standards). It is also assumed
that the instigation of those approach or avoidance behaviors depends mainly on the
perceived discrepancy between the actual self and standards (Carver and Scheier 1998;
Higgins 1987, 1997; Ogilvie 1987). The model tested in the present study suggests that
it is a function of combined assessments of both the actualization and the attainability
of standards.
One can imagine an individual who perceives themselves as very different
from their ideals (high actual-ideal discrepancy), which might result in negative
affect and reduced motivation. At the same time, however, that individual may
be strongly convinced that he or she has all the capacities and resources that
are required to reach this ideal, long-term goal in the future. Such a belief
should enhance motivation and efforts in realizing the goal and reduce the
negative affect. On the other hand, one can imagine the opposite situation, in
which a person is close to his or her ideal goal, which should promote efforts
to work towards that goal. Yet, if the person does not believe in his or her
capabilities to reach this proximal goal, such an effect will probably not occur.
Thus, it is hypothesized here that the regulatory functions of the perceived
actualization of standard is moderated by the perceived attainability of that
standard. A similar idea has, in fact, already been formulated (Carver et al.
1979; Duval et al. 1992; Silvia and Duval 2001). Unfortunately, it has not
resulted in making the discrepancies between self-standards and the can self
stable and proper elements of self-discrepancy models. The present study
provides arguments for doing so.
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Limitations and Future Research Directions
Conducting the study via the Internet turned out to be a convenient and
efficient way of collecting data. Skitka and Sargis (2006) argued that filling
out measures in the familiar context of one’s own home, in contrast to the
unfamiliar laboratory context, allows people to respond more naturally. The
motivation and involvement of those who decided to participate is then prob-
ably higher, which may substantially improve the quality and reliability of data.
However, there are also significant disadvantages and limitations of Internet
studies, some of them pertaining to the present study as well. First, the
response rate to an Internet study is usually low and varies from 10 to 25 %,
depending on the recruitment method (Birnbaum 2004; Skitka and Sargis 2006).
The 30 % response rate of the present study seems to be slightly higher than
average, but it still indicates that 70 % of potential participants did not log on
or dropped out before finishing the study. The results, then, may not be free of
the sampling bias.
Second, the high anonymity and low accountability of an Internet study may
increase the risk of getting unreliable data (Skitka and Sargis 2006). The
present study had to deal with this problem as well, since the data from 40
participants (8 % of those who logged on) were removed from the main
analyses due to one of the following reasons: (a) the descriptions of self-
standards were meaningless (e.g. “aaaaaaa,” “dddddd”); (b) they contained
vulgar words, which explicitly indicated a negative attitude towards the study;
(c) the VAS responses were made thoughtlessly (as indicated by clicking the
“further” button without making any assessment).
Third, the obtained results should not be directly generalized beyond the
student population. Generalization problems in Internet studies arise from the
fact that Web users differ from non-users in terms of age, education, and
socioeconomic status (Jackson et al. 2003; Suarez-Balcazar et al. 2009). This
does not apply to the student population because virtually all the students are
Web users. Thus, the presented model can be applied to students’ self-
knowledge, regardless of the fact that the data were collected via the Internet.
Nevertheless, the results should not be generalized to the broader population,
particularly to older adults from low-income backgrounds and with a low level
of education.
Regardless of the generalization issue, however, the obtained results may
serve as an inspiration for new hypotheses. The study presented in this paper
was focused solely on self-knowledge – i.e., the subjective perception of
oneself and the structural relations between different aspects of this cognitive
phenomenon. Although no objective indicators of behavior were measured, the
theoretical models of self-regulation (e.g., Carver and Scheier 1998; Higgins
1997) allow to predict some regulatory implications of self-knowledge structure.
Still, further studies are needed to address this problem directly. The regulatory
functions of the can self seem to be a possibly challenging problem. How do
the regulatory consequences of making the can self momentarily accessible
compare with the effects of activating self-standards? Does the perceived
attainability of standards directly enhance the process of goal attainment or
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does it rather moderate the regulatory functions of the perceived actualization of
standards? Future experimental research may use the proposed structural model
to investigate the dynamic processes of self-regulation.
Appendix
Table 3 Example attributes of self-standards (ideal, ought, undesired, and forbidden selves) as reported by a
randomly chosen 20-year-old male participant and the results of his self-discrepancy ratings, i.e., the
assessment of perceived actualization and perceived attainability of each self-standard attribute.
Self-standards’
attributes
Weight assigned to the
attribute depending on






what extent is it possible for
you to become …?b,c
The ideal self
What kind of person would you like to be? Name the traits you would like to possess, ones that describe you
as you would like to be in accordance with your dreams, wishes, and aspirations.c
Assertive 2 56 6
Brilliant 1 45 36
Unpredictable 1 65 33
Athletic 1 77 50
Eloquent 2 49 27
Resourceful 2 46 27
The ought self
What kind of person should you be? Name the traits you should possess, ones that describe you as you
should be in accordance with your sense of duty and responsibility.c
Responsible 2 46 21
Consistent 1 37 30
Ambitious 1 43 32
Hard-working 2 58 50
Polite 1 34 23
Caring 2 38 9
The undesired self
What kind of person wouldn’t you like to be? Name the traits you would not like to possess, ones that
describe you as you would not like to be.c
Nervous 2 36 62
Overbearing 1 41 73
Gloomy 1 52 88
Lazy 2 40 82
Cynical 2 56 78
Brusque 1 54 47
The forbidden self
What kind of person shouldn’t you be? Name the traits you should not possess, ones that describe you as
you should not be.c
Lazy 2 40 82
Egocentric 2 32 75
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